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DEBUNKING “DE MINIMIS” VIOLATIONS OF PRISONERS’
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS: FURTHER PROBLEMS WITH THE SUPREME
COURT’S “HANDS OFF” APPROACH
Samantha Sparacino*
ABSTRACT
Circuits are split as there continues to be an inconsistent
application of Supreme Court doctrine stemming from the notion of
the separation of church and the state. Imprisonment does not strip a
wrongdoer of his constitutionally guaranteed rights and protections.
Some Circuits have held that a minor, or de minimis, interpretation of
an inmate’s religious rights can constitute a substantial burden under
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. In the
absence of clear direction from the Supreme Court, I propose that
courts should refrain from determining the value of a religious belief
or practice as it relates to a religious adherent and err on the side of
providing religious accommodations whenever reasonable. This
would follow the intended goal of the religious-question doctrine and
protect constitutionally guaranteed rights as well as likely benefit the
society and the individual wrongdoer in his efforts towards
maintaining a law-abiding lifestyle.
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INTRODUCTION

Man's relation to his God was made no concern of the
state. He was granted the right to worship as he
pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his
religious views. The religious views espoused by
respondents might seem incredible, if not
preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines
are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding
their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with
the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact
undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain.
The First Amendment does not select any one group or
any one type of religion for preferred treatment. 1
Imprisonment does not strip an individual wrongdoer of his
constitutionally guaranteed rights and protections.2 The religion
clauses of the First Amendment center on a controversial topic of
discussion- religious practices and beliefs within correctional
institutions.3 The Constitutional framers’ uncontroversial objectives
of the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses were “both to prevent the
establishment of a national religion by the new federal government
and to protect the right of individuals to freely exercise their religious
beliefs.”4 A notable issue that arises when analyzing the Religion
Clause is that the Supreme Court has not provided a specific
definition of “religion.”5 Another crucial issue is the inconsistent
application of Supreme Court doctrine stemming from the notion of
the separation of church and the state. 6 This Note will argue that
1

United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987), superseded by statute, Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803
(2000) (“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the
protections of the Constitution.”).
3
Provision of Religious Facilities for Prisoners, 12 A.L.R.3d 1276 § 2.
4
Jeffrey L. Oldham, Constitutional “Religion” A Survey of First Amendment
Definitions of Religion, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117, 118 (2001).
5
Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion Under
the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other Disciplines of
Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83
N.D.L. REV. 123, 126 (2007).
6
Christopher C. Lund, Rethinking the "Religious-Question" Doctrine, 41 PEPP. L.
REV. 1013, 1014 (2014).
2
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until the Supreme Court clarifies the proper analysis for religious
exercise claims for the lower courts, the religious freedom of inmates
should be protected and their needs reasonably accommodated.
Kenneth Colvin, Jr., an inmate, brought claims against prison
officials, claiming they violated his constitutional rights as a Jewish
prisoner.7 Upon transfer from one state prison to another, he was
mistakenly denied service in accordance with a kosher-meal program
on numerous occasions.8 Prison officials erred in believing he was
instead a Muslim, and denied him kosher-meal status for a total of
sixteen days.9 Further, Colvin was served non-kosher food on
multiple occasions even when he finally obtained the formal dietary
status.10 Not only did the prison officials see no wrong in their
failure to assist in helping Colvin practice his religion, the trial court
dismissed certain claims “because any errors in the preparation of
[his] kosher meals were inadvertent and isolated.” 11 Contrary to the
value that a religious adherent places on his maintenance of a strict
kosher diet, the Sixth Circuit noted that the actions of the prison
officials “at worst, [constituted] a reasonable mistake” as to Colvin’s
status.”12 This is just one example of how a lack of uniformity in the
analysis of religious exercise cases leads to prison officials violating
prisoners’ constitutional rights.
This Note will focus on the courts’ inconsistencies when
analyzing religious accommodations and will highlight the need for
clearer principles and applications. It will address the circuit split on
the issue of whether a minor, or de minimis, interruption of a
prisoner’s religious rights can constitute a substantial burden as
outlined under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (“RLUIPA”).13 The Note will explain how the Supreme Court
expanded its rule prohibiting courts from delving into religious
questions.14 Additionally, it will provide examples of how courts fail
7

Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 2010).
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 288.
12
Id. at 291.
13
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5.
14
See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87 (“But if those [religious] doctrines are subject to trial
before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done
with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that risk,
they enter a forbidden domain.”).
8
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to refrain from interfering with religious questions. Lastly, the Note
will highlight the importance of clarification within the judicial
system with respect to religious questions.
This Note will be divided into six sections. Sections II and III
will introduce the doctrine at the forefront of the religious
accommodation claims and statutes pertaining to free religion claims.
The Supreme Court’s religious-question doctrine holds that the courts
should refrain from taking positions on religious issues and has an
extensive history.15 This doctrine emerged to support the country’s
system of separation between church and state. 16
Section IV will demonstrate the judicial history of religious
exercise claims and will examine the circuit split, how different
courts interpret religious exercise claims, and how they weigh the
religious adherent’s practices objectively. Lower courts are without
clear direction from the Supreme Court and thus inconsistently apply
the religious-question doctrine.17 For instance, some circuit courts
have answered religious questions using the term de minimis in
denying a religious prisoner’s First Amendment claim.18 The Second
and Seventh Circuits have determined that a de minimis violation of
an inmate’s free religious exercise rights may substantially burden his
beliefs.19 To the contrary, the Tenth Circuit has held that de minimis
inadvertent mishaps that clash with a prisoner’s religious rights do
not rise to a substantial burden.20
Section V will demonstrate the conflicting issues in the
balance of providing religious accommodations and penological
concerns. The primary reason that courts have denied religious
15

Lund, supra note 6, at 1014.
Id. at 1013.
17
Bernie Pazanowski, Muslim Inmate’s Free Exercise Suit Over Being Served Pork
Tossed,
BLOOMBERG
L.
(Apr.
24,
2020,
3:16
PM),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/white-collar-and-criminallaw/XC3D1FDO 000000?bna_news_filter=white-collar-and-criminal-law. There is
a circuit split on an issue of free exercise rights. Id. The Third, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits held that minor violations of an inmate’s religious rights do not
substantially burden his beliefs. Id. The Second and Seventh Circuits held that
such minor violations may substantially burden an inmate’s religious beliefs. Id.
18
See McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 203 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (“There may
be inconveniences so trivial that they are most properly ignored. In this respect,
this area of the law is no different from many others in which the time-honored
maxim ‘de minimis non curat lex’ applies.”).
19
See generally Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582 (2d. Cir. 2003).
20
See generally Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2009).
16
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accommodation requests are safety and prison security concerns. 21
Section V will then discuss the benefits of providing justifiable
religious accommodations whenever possible in accordance with an
individual’s First Amendment religious rights. Strong evidence has
established that religious practice within prison systems helps
promote rehabilitation and decrease recidivism rates. 22 “[T]he
percentage of prisoners professing minority faiths tends to be larger
than the proportion of those faiths among non-incarcerated adults in
the United States 18 years and older.” 23 Given these demographics, it
is crucial that all religious adherents are provided with the reasonably
necessary means to maintain their practices so that they have the
support and organization to encourage them to maintain a lawabiding lifestyle following their release. Notably, prisoners adhering
to minority religions are among those who file the largest number of
free religious exercise claims. 24
Lastly, Section VI will conclude the Note by proposing that in
the absence of clear direction from the Supreme Court, the courts
should protect constitutional rights whenever reasonable and
justifiable given the potential positive force of religion in prisons and
the possibility to provide the necessary additional protections to
religious minorities. Whether a minor de minimis intrusion or, as
some courts may label it, a more substantial infringement with a
religious right, courts should consider the impacts of any government
action and encourage religious accommodations to the fullest extent
practicable. A court that analyzes de minimis language should follow
the Second and Seventh Circuits by finding that any de minimis
violation of a prisoner’s religious rights could substantially burden
his beliefs.25

UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., ENFORCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
PRISON, 1, 91 (Sept. 2008), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=231715 (providing
a table that portrays the types of RLUIPA cases and reasons for their denials
annually).
22
Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and
Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
501, 511 (2005).
23
UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 39.
24
Id. at 102.
25
See infra Section II.
21
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THE FOREFRONT OF THE CONFUSION AMONG LOWER
COURTS

Inmates are faced with many restrictions on their liberty as a
consequence of their illegal actions. These people, however, under
the First Amendment, maintain their right to free religious exercise
while imprisoned.26 As correctional facility populations overflow, so
do the conflicts within these systems in regard to accommodating
prisoners’ religious beliefs.27 While prisons have policies in place to
guide religious practices, there have been continuous complaints
from prisoners arguing that the correctional staff members have
violated their constitutional religious rights.28 The circuit courts are
split on the issue of whether a de minimis 29 interruption of an
inmate’s religious rights substantially burdens his beliefs.
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”30 Under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)31:
[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person, including
a religious assembly or institution, unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the
burden on that person, assembly, or institution—(A) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest. 32
26

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 78; see also
Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Ben-Levi v. Brown, 136 S. Ct. 930 (2016).
28
See generally Enforcing Religious Freedom in Prison, supra note 21 (The United
States Commission on Civil Rights must transmit this report pursuant to Public
Law § 103-419. It analyzes governmental attempts to enforce federal civil rights
law precluding religious discrimination within the structure of federal and state
prisons. The findings from the data collected showed that there has been a steady
increase in the reported RLUIPA cases annually.).
29
(Of a fact or thing) so insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an
issue or case. De minimis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
30
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5.
32
Id.
27
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However, inmates’ religious rights are limited due to the weight of
the penological interests 33 that the courts must consider when
determining whether requested religious practices can be
accommodated.34
When a plaintiff meets the threshold of
demonstrating a prison’s substantial burden on his religious rights,
the responsibility then shifts to the defendant government to show
that the substantial burden is the result of a “compelling government
interest,”35 and that the government has invoked the “least restrictive
means”36 of accomplishing its penological objectives. 37

UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 3 (“The Court has
recognized that deterrence, rehabilitation, and institutional security are all valid
penological objectives that may result in limitations on prisoners’ rights.”); see also
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974).
34
Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002).
35
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Statement of the Department of Justice on the
Institutionalized Persons Provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/974661/download. A
“compelling governmental interest” is one that furthers “good order, security and
discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” Id. at 4.
For example, “requiring grooming in segregated holding has been found to further
the compelling interest of health and security and placing certain restrictions on the
formation of organized groups has been found to serve the limited interest of
preventing the growth of gangs.” Id. at 5. A compelling governmental interest has
not been found in the administration of a prison’s dietary system when the
correctional facility already serves meals that would satisfy the prisoner’s dietary
needs, as well as in instances where the government placed an arbitrary limit on the
quantity of books an inmate could store in his prison cell. Id.
36
Id. at 5. (“To satisfy the ‘least restrictive means’ requirement of RLUIPA, courts
have required institutions to show that alternative means of satisfying the
compelling government interest were considered and found insufficient. The
ability of other correctional institutions to further comparable interests without
using the challenged regulations is evidence that a less restrictive alternative is
available. Indeed, where a significant number of other institutions allow an
accommodation, an institution cannot deny that accommodation consistent with
RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny requirement unless the institution offers persuasive
reasons why it cannot adopt the less restrictive methods used elsewhere. Less
restrictive alternatives used by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) are particularly
relevant to the least restrictive means analysis because BOP manages the country’s
largest correctional system while adhering to the comparably strict protections for
religious exercise that are guaranteed by RFRA. Consequently, where BOP
accommodates a particular religious exercise, an institution that forbids that
exercise is unlikely to satisfy RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny inquiry unless it can
demonstrate that the BOP approach is unworkable.”).
37
Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir. 2010).
33
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Since the Supreme Court has consistently determined that the
judicial system should keep its “hands off” religious questions, the
Court should then, under a strict application of the religious-question
doctrine, and in the interests of the First Amendment’s Religion
Clauses, rule in favor of the Second and Seventh Circuits by
determining that a de minimis violation of a prisoner’s religious rights
may substantially burden his beliefs. 38 Federal courts have “no
business addressing” whether religious beliefs alleged in relation to
free exercise claims are reasonable. 39 “It cannot be gainsaid that the
judiciary is singularly ill-equipped to sit in judgment on the verity of
an adherent’s religious beliefs.”40 Since the subjective beliefs of the
religious adherents are crucial and unique, courts cannot precisely
clarify the value of a person’s specific beliefs and practices; thus, the
judicial system cannot sufficiently determine whether a religious
burden is de minimis. Therefore, given the Supreme Court’s lack of
guidance in relation to the proper application of the religiousquestion-doctrine to free religious exercise claims, lower courts are
left uncertain as to whether violations of specific religious
accommodations impede an individual’s constitutionally protected
rights.
III.

THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION DOCTRINE: DID THE SUPREME
COURT LEAVE THE LOWER COURTS TO INTERPRET THE
DOCTRINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR OWN OBJECTIVE
BELIEFS?

The idea that courts should refrain from taking positions on
religious questions has a long history. 41 The purpose of this notion
emerged from our nation’s system, supported by the Constitution,

38

Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969) “Thus, the departure-from-doctrine element of
the Georgia implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters at the
very core of a religion-the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the
importance of those doctrines to religion. Plainly, the First Amendment forbids
civil courts from playing such a role.” Id. at 450.
39
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 724 (2014) (The religious
claims here were that the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandates
substantially burdened their free religious exercise constitutional rights).
40
Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984).
41
Lund, supra note 6, at 1014.
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that separates the operations of church and state. 42 While simple at
first glance, the hands-off doctrine becomes complicated when a
court must determine a religious accommodation claim. The
complexity arises because a court must analyze the religious
accommodation claim before deciding on the issue. The application
of the “hands off” religious questions principle becomes complex as
courts must often analyze a religious accommodation claim to
determine if it may even adjudicate the claim in the first place. 43 In
1871, the Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones 44 established that judges
cannot decide “the true standard of good faith in the church
organization.”45
In 1944, the Supreme Court in United States v. Ballard 46
provided that while a religious claim raised may seem “incredible” to
some individuals, fact finders must not enter the “forbidden domain”
of determining its “truth or falsity.” 47 Then, in 1969, the Court in
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Church48 determined that the religion clauses of the First Amendment
direct courts to rule on disputes while refraining from resolving

42

Id. at 1013.
The hands-off doctrine has been coined by legal scholars and commentators to
refer to the notion that courts must refrain from deciding religious questions. See
Samuel J. Levine, The Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to Religious
Doctrine: An Introduction, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 793, 795 (2009) (“[T]here is
ample Supreme Court case law supporting the proposition that the Court generally
eschews decision making that requires adjudication of religious doctrine.”); Nathan
S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1198
(2017) (“Courts refer to the prohibition on deciding disputes about religious truth
as the ‘religious question doctrine.’ Scholars variously call it the ‘no religious
decision’ principle of the ‘hands-off approach’ to religious questions.”); William
Bennett Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners'
Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473, 473 (1971) (“For most of our history, the
complaints of prisoners about conditions of life in prison were ignored by the
courts. Judicial review was avoided under the ‘hands-off’ doctrine.”); Kent
Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1844 (1998) (“Government must keep out of
internal problems of religious bodies when those problems concern religious
understandings.”).
44
80 U.S. 679 (1871).
45
Id. at 727.
46
322 U.S. 78 (1944).
47
Id. at 87.
48
393 U.S. 440 (1969).
43
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religious doctrine issues.49 The Supreme Court held in Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich50 that courts shall not
contradict the religious interpretations of religious tribunals, and
expanded on this ruling in Thomas v. Review Board Indiana
Employment Security Division,51 by determining that it should not
contradict any religious authority. 52 In reaching its conclusion, the
Court determined that it was “ill equipped” to resolve a religious
doctrine question.53 The Thomas Court reasoned that:
it was not for [the courts] to say that the line he drew
was an unreasonable one.
Courts should not
undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the
believer admits that he is ‘struggling’ with his position
or because his beliefs are not articulated with clarity
and precision that a more sophisticated person might
employ.54
A substantial issue is that courts do in fact enter into the realm of
religious questions, in contradiction to Supreme Court precedent, to
adjudicate free exercise claims and prevent the flooding of the
courts.55 In order to protect both governmental institutions and
prisoners, there are three threshold inquiries that a claimant must pass
through in religious free exercise claims: (1) the claim must be based
on religious grounds, (2) the claimant must show that the lack of the
request sought would substantially burden her religious exercise, and
(3) she must demonstrate that she is sincere in her religious beliefs. 56
The “hands-off” doctrine flows from the principle that secular courts
49

Id. at 449.
426 U.S. 696 (1976).
51
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
52
Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to
Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 93 (1997).
53
Thomas, 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).
54
Id.
55
Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We
Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837 (2009) (“But the fact that judges
charged with deciding legal questions are usually unfamiliar with religious texts,
doctrines, and traditions would not seem to require, as a principled matter, a strong
hands-off rule. Judges answer hard questions, untangle complicated problems, and
educate themselves about new fields, all the time. They hear testimony; they listen
to experts; they consider arguments.”).
56
Adeel Mohammadi, Sincerity, Religious Questions, and the Accommodation
Claims of Muslim Prisoners, 129 YALE L.J. 1836, 1848 (2020).
50
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cannot resolve “metaphysical or theological issues.”57 While the
Court has yet to specifically define “religion,” it rarely challenges
“members of well-recognized traditions.”58 The claimant holds the
burden of establishing that her claims are grounded in religion, rather
than “purely philosophical, ethical, or other nonreligious grounds.”59
The Supreme Court, however, has yet to explicitly define and
demonstrate the difference between religious and nonreligious
claims.60 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,61 the Supreme Court noted that
determining which requested accommodation is a constitutionally
protected “religious” belief or practice “may present a most delicate
question.”62 Yoder further explained that a claim based on solely
secular considerations is not enough to be protected under the
Religious Establishment Clauses - it must be rooted in religious
belief.63 The Supreme Court, in Yoder, helped distinguish a religious
claim from a secular claim by reference to Henry Thoreau’s rejection
of the “social values of his time” by isolating himself at Walden
Pond.64 The Supreme Court noted that if the Amish claimants
brought their religious challenge because of their “subjective
evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values” like
Thoreau did, that would fail to constitute a “religious claim.”65
“Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than

57

Lund, supra note 6, at 1013.
Mohammadi, supra note 56, at 1849.
59
Id.
60
Id.; see also Ben Clements, Defining Religion in the First Amendment: A
Functional Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532, 536 (1989). The Note proposes
that:
[A] constitutional definition of religion should meet three main
criteria, in addition to the criterion of general compatibility with
approaches suggested by the Supreme Court. First, it should be
specific enough to circumscribe the concept of religion, and
allow courts to distinguish nonreligious from religious beliefs.
Second, it should be flexible enough to embrace new and
unorthodox forms of religion. Third, it should be applicable to
both free exercise clause cases and establishment clause cases.
Id.
61
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
62
Id. at 215-16.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 216.
65
Id.
58

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2021], Art. 17

1684

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion
Clauses.”66
While courts are “ill equipped” to determine the truth and
content of a religious belief or practice, courts must analyze a
claimant’s particular beliefs to determine their actual sincerity to
avoid flooding the judicial system with frivolous claims. 67 Legal
scholars and commentators commonly understand United States v.
Ballard68 as the origin of the sincerity doctrine in relation to free
religious exercise claims. 69 Ballard stands for the proposition that
while courts may never rule on the veracity of a religious claim, the
sincerity of such alleged beliefs is within the judicial scope.70
Justice Ginsburg’s comment in the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.71 dissent noted that courts were judicially incompetent to
determine the merits of various religious claims and the sincerity of
such beliefs.72 However, as courts determine the sincerity of person’s
religious claims, some seek extrinsic evidence to answer religious
questions.73 This judicial evaluation often relies on the testimony of
religious experts to confirm that, although not dispositive, the belief
is idiosyncratic.74 Seemingly contrary to the “hands-off” religiousquestion doctrine, courts also use religious text to parallel and
confirm the purported religious adherent’s beliefs. 75
IV.

JUDICIAL HISTORY

To demonstrate the unclear Supreme Court doctrine, it is
useful to review cases and observe how the religious-question
doctrine confuses the lower courts as they attempt to analyze free
religious exercise challenges. In order to determine whether the
substantial burden element of a RLUIPA claim is met, the courts
must analyze questions relating to a claimant’s religion. The circuits
are split on the issue of whether a de minimis interruption of an
66

Id.
See United States. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)
68
Id.
69
Mohammadi, supra note 56, at 1855.
70
Id.
71
573 U.S. 682 (2014).
72
Id. at 771 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
73
Mohammadi, supra note 56, at 1864.
74
Id. at 1867-68.
75
Id. at 1871.
67
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inmate’s religious rights substantially burdens his constitutional
rights under the First Amendment. 76 However, the Supreme Court’s
religious-question doctrine prevents courts from taking positions on
religious questions. Thus, in order to analyze a RLUIPA claim, by
determining how substantial a religious violation is, the lower courts
must contradict the overarching Supreme Court rule and put an
objective value on a governmental violation of an individual’s
subjective religious belief.
The Second Circuit in Ford v. McGinnis77 noted that “the
Circuits apparently are split over whether prisoners must show a
substantial burden on their religious exercise in order to maintain free
exercise claims.”78 It is apparent, however, that the courts have
interpreted the measure of a “substantial burden”79 to be the issue
that the courts are split on. For instance, the Second Circuit agrees
that a de minimis interruption of an inmate’s religious exercise may
be sufficient to go forward with a religious discrimination claim
because a more strict and objective test would require courts to
differentiate “important from unimportant religious beliefs, a task for
which [it has] already explained courts are particularly ill-suited.”80
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit concludes that inadvertent and
isolated mistakes by correctional institutions which impact prisoners’
religious rights do not constitute a substantial burden sufficient to
proceed on a RLUIPA claim. 81
Religious
grievance
claims
relating
to
dietary
accommodations within particular religious sects are the most
prominent of the complaints received from prisoners.82 In Ford, a

Mbonyunkiza v. Beasley, 956 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2020) (“As the district
court noted, there is extensive (but not total) agreement that an isolated,
intermittent, or otherwise de minimis denial or interruption of an inmate’s
religiously required diet does not substantially burden his religious belief.”).
77
352 F.3d 582, 592 (2d Cir. 2003).
78
Id.
79
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5.
80
Ford, 352 F.3d at 593.
81
See Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009).
82
UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 22-24. The studies of
the Commission found that some of the most frequently filed group of religious
grievances are those relating to the dietary practices of religious adherents. Id. at
22. Among all of the federal prisons that were investigated combined, 33.6% of all
religious grievances fell under the category relating to the “delivery/preparation of
religious diet.” Id. at 24. Among all of the federal prisons that were studied, they
76
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Muslim inmate sued alleging a violation of his First Amendment
right to free religious exercise when the prison denied his request to
attend a religious feast. 83 Even though the feast was just one meal, it
was significant because it was an Eid al-Fitr feast, which was
celebrated only once per year to mark the conclusion of Ramadan.84
The district court granted the correctional officials’ motion for
summary judgment because the prison adjourned the celebration meal
to a date eight days “after the period prescribed by Muslim law and
tradition” to accommodate a number of Muslim inmates who
expressed their desire to hold the event on a weekend to enable their
families to attend.85
On the day on which Eid al-Fitr was observed at Downstate
Correctional Facility (“Downstate”), Ford was transferred there from
another institution for a court appearance without notice that the
traditional feast was postponed to a later date. 86 While temporarily
housed in Downstate’s Special Housing Unit, Ford learned of the
new date the feast was scheduled, requested that he receive the Eid
al-Fitr feast on that date, and was subsequently denied permission. 87
Despite the memorandum disbursed to the Muslim Chaplains within
the Department of Correctional Services noting that Special Housing
Unit inmates should be included in the “ministerial plans for
Ramadan and the Ids,” Ford was nevertheless not given permission to
attend the feast, and was instead incorrectly informed after the
passing of this date that Special Housing Unit inmates would not
receive the feast. 88 After sending grievance letters to the institution,
he commenced an action claiming that he was denied his First
Amendment rights.89 In granting the government defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, the district court agreed with the defendants’
contention that Ford’s religious beliefs were not substantially
burdened since the feast was rescheduled beyond the three days

accounted for 10.8% of religious grievances relating to complaints regarding
“access to religious diet.” Id.
83
Ford, 352 F.3d at 584.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 584-85.
86
Id. at 584.
87
Id. at 585.
88
Id. at 585-86.
89
Id. at 586.
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following the end of Ramadan and thus, “no longer carried any
objective religious significance.”90
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted the significance of the
district court doubting Ford’s sincerity in his religious beliefs. 91 The
Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case because the lower
court improperly held that the plaintiff’s “individualized, subjective”
religious beliefs were not entitled to protection after having been
advised of “Islam’s actual requirements” of holding the Eid al-Fitr
feast within three days close of Ramadan. 92 Since it focused solely
on objective views of another’s religious beliefs, the lower court
improvidently held that there was an absence of a substantial burden
because it was a “minor” disruption, and thus, provided a basis to
grant the prison’s motion as a matter of law.
In Thompson v. Holm,93 a Muslim inmate sued members of
the prison staff, alleging that they violated his freedom of religion
under the First Amendment when the staff refused to allow him to
properly fast during Ramadan.94 The district court granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Thompson’s
failure to receive two meal bags for “just two days” was not a
substantial burden on his free religious exercise rights because he was
still able to fast, pray, and read the Koran. 95 In reversing and
remanding the case, the Seventh Circuit defined a substantial burden
as an act conducted by a government employee that “put[s]
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to
violate his beliefs.”96 The defendant prison argued that the inmate’s
90

Id.
Id. at 588; see Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d
570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002) (“An individual claiming violation of free exercise rights
need only demonstrate that the beliefs professed are ‘sincerely held’ and in the
individual’s ‘own scheme of things, religious.” (quoting Patrick v. LeFevre, 745
F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984))); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 18485 (1965) (“Local boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs
because they consider them ‘incomprehensible.’ Their task is to decide whether the
beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own
scheme of things, religious.”).
92
Ford, 352 F.3d at 588.
93
809 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2016).
94
Id. at 378.
95
Id. at 379; see also Thompson v. Holm, No. 13-CV-930, 2015 WL 1478523
(E.D. Wis. 2015), vacated, 809 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2016).
96
Thompson, 809 F.3d at 379-80 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981)).
91
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choice between adequate nutrition and a “central tenet” of his
religion97 was only a de minimis burden of his constitutionally
protected right and did not rise to a “substantial burden.” 98
Thompson began fasting on August 11, 2010, the first day of
Ramadan, and the day he began to receive his daily meal bags.99 He
was provided with the bags every day until a disputed 100 interruption
occurred on August 21.101 After expressing his grievances to the
correctional employees, he was left with no more meals and had to
decide whether to continue to not eat at all for the approximate twothirds left of the Ramadan fasting or break his fast and go to the
cafeteria.102 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the defendant’s
contention that such a choice to the plaintiff was “simply” a de
minimis burden, explaining that:
[n]ot only did Thompson receive no proper meal for
55 hours, leaving him
weak and tired, he did not know if he would ever be
put back on the Ramadan
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, TECHNICAL REFERENCE
T5360.01, INMATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES: ISLAM, Pages 17-18 (2002)
(“Ramadhan, the ninth month of the Islamic lunar calendar, is the month where
Muslims begin their period of fasting. This month is a holy month for Islam
because during it Muhammad received his initial revelation, made his historic
Hijrah from Mecca to Medina and the battle of Badr was won . . . . The fast begins
with dawn and ends with sunset. Depending on the sighting of the moon, the fast
may be 29 or 30 days long. Eating and drinking stops at dawn. During the day, no
eating, drinking or sexual activity can take place. A Muslim must also adhere
strictly to the moral code, as failure there is considered to be a violation of the
requirements of fasting.”).
98
Thompson, 809 F.3d at 379-80.
99
Id. at 378. Meal bags were distributed daily during Ramadan at sunset to each
Muslim prisoner listed as eligible. Id. The prison’s chaplain determines eligibility.
Id. Each Ramadan meal bag contains two meals: the post-sunset dinner and the
next morning’s pre-sunrise breakfast. Id.
100
Id. at 380 (“Thompson says that shortly before August 21, as he was on his way
back to his cell, Randall Lashock, a prison guard, handed him a meal bag. When
Thompson arrived at his cell, he found that a guard had already left a meal bag for
him there. Thompson could not leave his cell to return the extra bag without
risking a conduct violation, so he left one of the two bags unopened for Lashock to
retrieve. Lashock asserts that when he later retrieved that extra meal bag from
Thompson’s cell, he found Thompson eating from both bags.”).
101
Id.
102
Id.
97
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list and get regular food. This uncertainty put pressure
on him to resign himself
to the cafeteria; the anxiety left him unable to practice
Ramadan properly.103
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit in Colvin v. Caruso104
held that an isolated or intermittent denial or interruption of an
alleged religious practice did not constitute a substantial burden in
relation to a free religious exercise case. 105 Colvin, a Jewish inmate,
sued after he was transferred to a correctional institution and was
initially denied kosher-meal status, a position he had pursuant to a
settlement agreement and court order. 106 He brought this challenge,
among others,107 since the later facility incorrectly believed that he
was not approved and that he was instead Muslim.108 After the
plaintiff notified the correctional officials of their error and filed two
grievances, he was finally placed on the kosher-meal program.109
Colvin was denied kosher-meal status for sixteen days and despite
eventually being placed in the program, the prison nevertheless
incidentally served him non-kosher food on multiple occasions.110
The district court in Colvin dismissed the claims because “any
errors in the preparation of Colvin’s kosher meals were inadvertent
and isolated.”111 The Sixth Circuit, in affirming the decision of the
lower court, determined that the chaplain unknowingly interfered
with Colvin’s religious practices and, “at worst, committed a
‘reasonable mistake’ as to Colvin’s status.”112 The Sixth Circuit
justified the denial of the kosher meals by reasoning that the chaplain
looked into the plaintiff’s eligibility to receive kosher meals but
103

Id.
605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010).
105
Id. at 286.
106
See supra text accompanying notes 7-12.
107
Id. at 287. Colvin also alleged that his free religion exercise rights were violated
by the lack of Jewish services and literature within the prison under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Id. For the purposes of narrowing my arguments within this
Note, the Note will be focusing solely on the religious discrimination claims raised
in the dietary practice nature.
108
Colvin, 605 F.3d at 286.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 287-88.
111
Id. at 288.
112
Id. at 291.
104
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determined that he was a Muslim. 113 Pursuant to the Federal Bureau
of Prisons’ Practical Guidelines for Administration of Inmate Beliefs
and Practices, “Judaism places its distinctive imprint on the most
ubiquitous practice, the eating experience, in what are known as
kosher laws.” 114 Thus, it cannot, and according to the Supreme
Court, should not be disputed that following kosher law may,
subjectively or objectively, be a means of manifesting some “central
tenet” of Jewish law and religion.
The Tenth Circuit in Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone115 held that the
government’s isolated or intermittent denial or interruption of an
inmate’s religious rights may not constitute a substantial burden on
an inmate’s religious exercise. 116 In Abdulhaseeb, a Muslim inmate
filed suit under RLUIPA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, bringing forward
several complaints in relation to his conditions of incarceration,
including his unsuccessful attempts to be provided halal foods.117
The plaintiff claimed he was forced to accept puddings and jello that
were not halal, as evidenced by the lack of halal symbols on the
items.118 He was denied an alternative after requesting one because
he “had not been forced” to accept the foods, and the defendant
government explained its refusal to accommodate by claiming that
what he was served did not contain pork or its by-products, “thus
meeting [his] Islamic beliefs.” 119
The plaintiff continuously
requested accommodations according to his Muslim beliefs with a
supporting halal diet, and they were consistently denied. 120 The court
held that he failed to present evidence that the vegetarian and pork-

113

Id.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 97, at 50-54.
115
600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010).
116
Id. at 1321.
117
Id. at 1306; see Nick Eardley, What is Halal Meat?, BBC NEWS (May 12, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-27324224 (“Halal is Arabic for permissible. Halal
food is that which adheres to Islamic law, as defined by the Koran.”).
118
Id. The plaintiff filed a “grievance concerning being forced to accept puddings
and jello on his tray.” Id. He alleged that the defendants represented the food items
to him as kosher but they failed to contain kosher or halal symbols, so, he claimed,
they contained forbidden ingredients pursuant to his religion. Id, The prison
challenged, claiming he was never forced to place the jello or pudding on his tray
and that they were pork-free and did not contain pork by-products, “thus meeting
[his] Islamic beliefs.” Id. at 1306-07.
119
Id. at 1306-07.
120
Id. at 1306.
114
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free diets that he was instead offered “forced him to modify or violate
his religious beliefs.”121
Abdulhaseeb argued that he sincerely believed that he must
eat a halal diet that includes halal meats; thus, the vegetarian and
pork-free alternatives that he was instead offered would not
suffice.122 The Tenth Circuit, in reviewing the case, determined that
the plaintiff’s subjective beliefs should be measured to determine
whether such interference would substantially burden his religious
exercise rights.123 In the context of RLUIPA claims, the Tenth
Circuit defined a substantial burden as when a government:
(1) requires participation in an activity prohibited by a
sincerely held religious belief, or (2) prevents
participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held
religious belief, or (3) places substantial pressure on
an adherent either not to engage in conduct motivated
by a sincerely held religious belief or to engage in
conduct contrary to a sincerely held religious belief,
such as where the government presents the plaintiff
with a Hobson’s choice—an illusory choice where the
only realistically possible course of action trenches on
an adherent’s sincerely held religious belief. 124
Though the Tenth Circuit found that there were genuine issues of
material fact on whether the policy regarding halal foods
substantially burdened the plaintiff’s rights, the court explained that it
will not imply that a de minimis interruption of a religious practice
can constitute a substantial burden. 125 The court said: “we do not
intend to imply that every infringement on a religious exercise will
constitute a substantial burden.” 126 The circuit split is likely due to
the fact that courts and parties to litigation struggle to define when a
certain religious accommodation refusal by correctional institutions
constitutes a “substantial burden” sufficient to maintain a RLUIPA
claim.127 It is apparent from the overwhelming case law that courts
121

Id. at 1313.
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1315.
125
Id. at 1316.
126
Id.
127
Mbonyunkiza v. Beasley, 956 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2020). Compare
Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 372 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2004)
122
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are uncertain on their application of the overarching religiousquestion doctrine and they are not provided strict guidance on how to
measure substantial burdens on a religious right without infringing on
the Supreme Court doctrine.
V.

THE NEED FOR CONSISTENCY AMONG THE COURTS
REGARDING THE ANALYSIS OF FREE RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
CLAIMS

As the circuit cases illustrate, ruling on RLUIPA claims in the
shadow of the religious-question doctrine results in inconsistent
applications and determinations. There should be no circuit split on
this issue because it is not the courts’ responsibility to determine the
weight or burden of a governmental violation on a specific religious
adherent’s beliefs.128
Courts must not restrict religious constitutional rights on the
basis of an unclear, unsettled doctrine. Until lower courts are
provided with some direction on how to define and examine
substantial burdens on religious rights without answering religious
questions, they should err on the side of protecting religious freedom.
To the extent that religious accommodations can be met in
accordance with compelling state interests, reasonable religious
accommodation requests should not be restricted in the absence of
any clear direction in relation to the religious-question doctrine.

(defined a substantial burden as when the “government policy or actions: must
‘significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that manifests some central
tenet of a [person’s] individual [religious] beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a
[person’s] ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a [person]
reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a
[person’s] religion.”), with Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996)
(defined a substantial burden on religious exercise as “one that forces adherents of
a religion to refrain from religiously motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains
conduct or expression that manifests a central tenant of a person’s religious beliefs,
or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.” This case was
vacated on other grounds.).
128
Greenawalt, supra note 43, at 1844.
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The Importance of The Continuous Consideration
of Penological Objectives

To avoid flooding the courts with frivolous claims, it is not
reasonable for every religious accommodation to be met, especially
in circumstances where such requests are outweighed by a
compelling state interest. 129 The main objective of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons is to protect the nation’s general population by
holding offenders inside of prison environments that are safe, secure,
and abundant with opportunities that “assist offenders in becoming
law-abiding citizens.”130 In relation to religious accommodations,
governments are uniformly concerned with extremist activity 131 that
could disrupt the security of its prisons.132 Prisoners have been found
to be prone to both religious and political radicalization due to factors
such as “inmates’ relative youth, unemployment, social alienation,
and their need for self-importance and physical security which is
often satisfied by the adoption of some group identity.”133 However,
in order to both protect constitutional religious rights of prisoners and
to ensure that prison policies are meeting their safety and
organizational objectives, the government’s security concerns must
be “grounded on more than mere speculation, exaggerated fears, or
post-hoc rationalizations.”134
Most RLUIPA cases that are denied by federal courts are due
to successful prison safety and security defenses raised by
correctional institutions.135 For instance, the Eighth Circuit found
129

See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 362 (2015) (the court emphasized the
government’s compelling interest in the case-namely, in prison safety and security).
130
About
Our
Agency,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
PRISONS,
https://www.bop.gov/about/agency/agency_pillars.jsp (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
131
See UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 32 (During the
briefing by the United States Commission on Civil Rights, two experts
demonstrated similar definitions for radicalization-the “process by which inmates
adopt political or religious extremism, including ‘the willingness to use, support or
facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.’”) (quoting Prepared
Statement of Frank Cilluffo, USCCR Feb. 8, 2008 briefing at 3).
132
Id. (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation has identified prisons as fertile
breeding grounds for extremist activity.”).
133
Id. at 33.
134
Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 939 (2008) (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-111, at
10 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1900 (Senate Report on RFRA)).
135
U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 94 (“As the number of RLUIPA
cases increased, safety/prison security remained the most common reason cited for
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that a compelling state interest outweighed the request for a religious
accommodation in the case of a prisoner claimant challenging the
prison’s failure to accommodate him with a sweat lodge. 136 The
prison officials did not challenge the sincerity of the religious
adherent’s request for a sweat lodge nor did they question the notion
that their denial of the religious accommodation would substantially
burden the claimant’s beliefs. 137 The sweat lodge is undoubtedly
religiously sacred to the claimant since he claimed his Native
American beliefs require the use of a sweat lodge to participate in a
fixed set of songs and prayers.138 The compelling governmental
interest instead prevailed here and the court afforded due deference to
the prison officials who were concerned that a sweat lodge would
pose risks of “sexual misconduct, physical assault, and drug use, as
well as fire and heat-related safety concerns.”139

denial of prisoners’ requests/complaints each year”); see also Jihad v. Fabian, 680
F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D. Minn. 2010). The plaintiff argued that the defendants
substantially burdened his religious exercise by preventing him from wearing a
Kufi, and requiring him to hide his religious medallion under his clothing, which
precluded him from expressing his Islamic identity. Id. at 1027. The court there
found that the plaintiff would likely fail on his religious garment claim since he
failed to establish a substantial burden on his religious practice. Id. The court
further noted that even if the plaintiff successfully demonstrated a substantial
burden on the part of the prison, his claim would likely not succeed because it
would be outweighed by a compelling governmental interest. Id.; Portley-El v.
Zavaras, 188 F.3d 519 at *2 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that, in Religious
Establishment Clause cases, the government’s restriction of religious headgear “is
entirely appropriate” because it poses potential security threats, as such headgear
“may be used to conceal drugs, weapons, or other contraband, and may spark
internal violence among prisoners.”).
136
Fowler, 534 F.3d at 939 (“But no reasonable jurist, affording due deference to
prison officials, can dispute that serious safety and security concerns arise when
inmates at a maximum security prison are provided ready access to (1) burning
embers and hot coals, (2) blunt instruments such as split wood and large scalding
rocks, (3) sharper objects such as shovels and deer antlers, and (4) an enclosed area
inaccessible to outside view.”).
137
Id. at 935.
138
Id. at 934.
139
Id. at 935. (“[Defendant] Wood also explained that the sweat lodge would
‘consume considerable institutional financial and personnel resources’ and ‘expend
many institutional personnel hours.’ Finally, Wood indicated that extending unique
privileges such as a sweat lodge to one group of inmates to the exclusion of others
creates the risk of resentment among the inmate population leading to the potential
for unrest and disturbance.”).
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To the contrary, other courts have decided that there are
instances in which it will protect free religious exercise by
accommodating prisoners.140 In Fegans v. Norris, 141 the claimant
formally notified the detention center he was housed in that he was a
follower of the Assemblies of Yahweh and began submitting requests
for a kosher diet.142 The detention center informed him that kosher
meals were not available and instead placed him on a pork-free
diet.143 After challenging the prison’s meal policies and exhausting
his administrative remedies, he brought suit against the prison
officials.144 The district court found that because the detention center
did not provide the claimant with kosher meals from December 19,
2002 until March 3, 2004, the Director of Corrections “knowingly
violated established law requiring kosher diets.”145
B.

The Powerful Role of Religion in Correctional
Facilities

Religion can play an important role in correctional institutions
and it is critical that the prison systems provide as many
accommodations as possible. Prisons may further their penological
goals by equipping inmates with sufficient religious
accommodations. For example, by fostering prisoners’ free religious
exercise rights, the inmates are motivated by strict discipline and
order.146 Since there is strong evidence that “spiritual development
and religious practice promote rehabilitation and reduce recidivism in
inmates,” it is vital that inmates are provided with the means
necessary to practice their religion, as long as those means can be
obtained without clashing with any compelling government
interests.147
Evidence derived from the study of in-prison religious
programs has shown that religious accommodations within
140

See generally Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897, 909 (8th Cir. 2008).
537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008).
142
Id. at 900.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 901.
145
Id.
146
UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 30.
147
Gaubatz, supra note 22, at 511; see also 139 CONG. REC. S14, 465 (daily ed.
Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[E]xposure to religion is the best hope
we have for rehabilitation of a prisoner . . .”).
141
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correctional facilities are a valuable asset to society as a whole. 148
Scholars have demonstrated that the role of religion in prison systems
contributes positively to inmate psychology, emotions, and selfcontrol.149 Inmates are influenced by the strict principles and
discipline that surround the practice of their particular religion which,
in turn, assist them with self-control.150 Another benefit of becoming
involved with religious groups within correctional institutions is the
opportunity to meet new peers with similar interests.151 Social
interaction within religious settings helps foster the acceptance of
individuals by other inmates within the prison system. 152 These
factors, among many others, have demonstrated that religion plays a
key role in rehabilitating individual prisoners so that their likelihood
of maintaining a law-abiding lifestyle increases upon release.153
C.

The Importance of Protecting Religious Minorities

Religious adherents of non-Christian faiths must have the
same degree of accommodations as provided to those who observe
and practice the Christian faith. A report by the United States
Commission on Civil Rights found that male inmates of Muslim,
Jewish, and Native American faiths, acting pro se, filed the largest
number of RLUIPA claims based on its studies. 154 Further, the
Commission found that both state and federal systems expressed
hardships in attempting to locate chaplains from minority religions
such as Islam.155
Prejudice and the lack of enforcement of equal protection for
minority religious communities continue to act as a barrier to uniform
treatment among prisons notwithstanding the alleged elimination of
language expressly denying religious accommodation to one minority
148

See generally Grant Duwe & Byron R. Johnson, Estimating the Benefits of a
Faith-Based Correctional Program, INT’L J. OF CRIMINOLOGY AND SOCIO. 227-239
(2013),
http://www.baylorisr.org/wp-content/uploads/benefits_faithbased_correctional_program.pdf.
149
Harry R. Dammer, Religion in Corrections, U. OF SCRANTON (2002),
https://www.scranton.edu/faculty/dammer/ency-religion.shtml.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 102.
155
Id. at 33.
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religious group and accommodating other traditional religious
groups.156 For instance, in the early 1960s, although “the general
policy of the Department of Corrections [was] to encourage religious
activities by inmates,” those alleged guidelines were not applied
across all religious communities, including Muslims.157 As recent as
sixty years ago, the State Advisory Committee on Institutional
Religion determined that while those traditional well-known religious
communities were permitted to pursue their spiritual activities,
Muslims were not afforded this same type of freedom.158 In In re
Ferguson,159 the Muslim petitioners alleged that:
they [were] not allowed a place to worship, that their
religious meetings [were] broken up, often by force,
that they [were] not allowed to discuss their religious
doctrines, that they [were] not allowed to possess an
adequate amount of religious literature, and that their
religious leaders [were] not allowed to visit them in
prison.160
There were three instances in which one of the Muslim petitioners
requested a copy of “the Muslim Bible,” the Koran, and was denied
such accommodation.161 Petitioner Ferguson’s Muslim religious
scrapbook was in the possession of another Muslim inmate when it
was confiscated by prison officials and destroyed since it was
considered contraband.162 The correctional officer, in his incident
report relating to the scrapbook, stated that “this book consisted of
the usual ‘Muslim’ trash, advocating hatred of the white race,
superiority of the black man ,….” 163 The California Supreme Court
ultimately denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought by nine
inmates, noting that the correctional staff reasonably denied religious
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freedom given the safety and security concerns with Muslim
prisoners.164
Data collection has shown that the percentage of prisoners
eighteen years of age and older who associate themselves with
minority religious groups tends to be larger in comparison to the
proportion of those faiths among non-incarcerated individuals in the
United States eighteen years of age and older. 165 It is necessary that
correctional employees are provided with sufficient training on the
various religions and their practices to ensure equality among the
differing beliefs within the prison systems. 166 By providing prisoners
with reasonable religious accommodations to the fullest extent
possible, it is likely that those individuals will succeed more
efficiently in their rehabilitation efforts, thereby reducing the
recidivism rates so that prisons can instead spend their budgets on
religious accommodations rather than housing repeat offenders. An
individual’s religious beliefs are sacred and beneficial; thus,
governments must provide reasonable accommodations when
requested and justifiable.
Chaplains play a crucial role in the encouragement of religion
in correctional facilities. 167 These individuals generally “provide
pastoral care and counseling to all inmates, regardless of the inmate’s
faith.”168 Prisons are not mandated to employ chaplains representing
every religious association within the correctional institution. 169
However, in 2007, the Federal Bureau of Prisons employed 251
chaplains.170 Among that total number of chaplains, unsurprisingly,
“73.9% were Protestant, 17.4% were Catholic, 0.8% were Orthodox
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Christian, and the remaining 7.9% were from non-Christian religionsBuddhism (0.4%), Judaism (2.1%), and Islam (5.4%).”171
To offset the imbalance among the chaplains representing the
well-known religious groups in comparison to the minority religions,
the Bureau of Prisons often rely heavily on contracts with outside
religious leaders to perform as clergy for the underrepresented
groups.172 These religious contractors and volunteers help meet the
“religious and spiritual needs of federal inmates professing nonChristian faiths
or membership in smaller Christian
173
denominations.”
Unfortunately, however, some federal prisons,
notwithstanding their best efforts, have expressed an overall
challenge in employing chaplains, volunteers, and contractors of nonChristian faiths, particularly Islam. 174 In the absence of clear
direction from higher courts in analyzing a prisoner’s RLUIPA claim,
it is crucial that governments work to allocate more resources to
assist prisoners associated with minority religions to obtain access to
religious resources just as the other prisoners are afforded such
opportunities.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The supreme law of the land provides that freedom of religion
does not terminate upon the imposition of an incarceration
sentence.175 Since religious beliefs and practices tend to help guide
spiritual adherents through their daily lives, it is necessary that the
government offers as many justifiable accommodations as possible in
the absence of clear direction from the Supreme Court. While the
religious-question doctrine’s purpose to keep courts from putting
objective values on subjective and personal beliefs is important, the
Court’s approach is difficult to apply in principle. In ruling that
courts should not be in the business of deciding matters in connection
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with the interpretation of religious practices and beliefs, 176 the
practical reality is that lower courts must engage in religious
interpretation when ruling on religious exercise claims. Thus, the
courts should err on the side of prisoners’ religious freedoms by
protecting these rights.
Lower courts, in the absence of a clear doctrine, have clearly
become willing to engage in their own determination of the
importance of a particular individual’s religious beliefs and practices,
as evidenced by the circuit split regarding the measure of de minimis
violations of a prisoner’s religious rights. If courts were to apply the
religious-question doctrine strictly, the term “de minimis” should
never be used in relation to the alleged burden that the prison officials
impose on prisoners since the burden is personal in nature. While
other scholars have proposed narrow recommendations to help
facilitate a clearer application of the religious-question doctrine,177 it
is clear that it would be in the best interests of all to refrain from
restricting prisoners’ justifiable religious requests until the Supreme
Court clarifies the religious-question doctrine. Constitutional rights
of religious exercise must continue to be reasonably accommodated
in prison settings until the Supreme Court provides clear direction on
how the lower courts should analyze religious questions. Therefore, I
propose that de minimis should no longer be used to qualify the
176
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strength of a subjective prisoner’s religious beliefs and courts should
err on the side of such prisoners to protect their constitutional rights.
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